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II.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals, following an appeal from the Fourth District
Court in and for Wasatch County. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h).
III.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Has Appellant met her burden of marshalling all evidence at trial tending to support the
Court's findings and then demonstrating that despite such evidence the Court's findings are so
lacking support as to be against the clear weight of evidence? Hagen v. Hagen. 810 P.2d 478 (Utah
App. 1991)
2.

Has Appellant established the Court clearly and prejudicially abused its discretion in:

(a) Imputing income to Mrs. Turner based on her 1995 earnings?
(b) Calculating child support based on the Uniform Child Support Guidelines?
(c) Not awarding alimony to Mrs. Turner based on the respective income and expenses of
the parties and Mrs. Turner's interest in Duke Farms, Inc.?
(d) Awarding each party a one-half interest in the martial home with Mrs. Turner given the
option to buy out Mr. Turner's interest in the home immediately or sell the home and
divide the equity when (a) the home is sold; (b) the youngest child reaches age 18 and
graduates from high school, (c) Mrs. Turner remarries, co-habits with a male or dies; (d)
Mrs. Turner ceases to use the home as her primary residence for more than three
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months; or (e) at any other time prior to the foregoing events in Mrs. Turner's sole
discretion?
(e) Dividing the USAA debt equally between the parties?
(f) Awarding Mrs. Turner $1,650.00 attorney's fees?
(Trial Court has considerable discretion in determining the financial interests of divorced
parties and property and alimony awards will be upheld on appeal absent a showing of clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Bingham v. Bingham. 872 P.2d 1065,1067 (Utah App. 1994)).
3. Mr. Turner requests his attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
IV.
STATUTES
Page
Section 30-3-5(7)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended

13

Section 78-45-7.5(7)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended

8,11

Section 78-45-7.7(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended

11

Section 78-45-7.14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended

11
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V.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition
On or about October 18,1995, Melvon David Turner, (hereinafter "Mr. Turner") filed an
action in the District Court of Wasatch County, Utah, seeking a divorce from Di Ann Carol Turner,
(hereinafter "Mrs. Turner").
On November 21,1996, the case was tried without a jury before the Honorable Howard H.
Maetani. Following the trial, the Court ordered that the parties' counsel submit proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to the issues which were not settled prior to trial.
On February 13,1997, Judge Maetani made and entered his Memorandum Decision setting
forth his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (See Addendum A)
On April 29,1997, the Court executed its Supplemental Memorandum Decision setting
forth additional Findings of Fact. (See Addendum B)
On June 13,1997, the Court executed the Supplemental Decree of Divorce after having
resolved post-trial issues primarily relating to the language to be included in the Supplemental
Decree of Divorce. (See Addendum C)
On September 2,1997, the Court executed the Order on Objection to Supplemental Decree
of Divorce, Motion to Correct Clerical Error and Rule 52 and 55 Motions. (See Addendum D)
B. Statement of Relevant Facts
1. Mr. Turner is a twenty-five year employee at the Utah Department of Employment
Security earning $53,534.00 per year or $4,461.00 per month. Mr. Turner has no other income
from any other source. (711 FOF; Tr. 12,26; Exhibit 1).
1

2. Mrs. Turner is employed at the Veteran's Hospital as a nurse. She has degrees in both
education and nursing. Her income from nursing was $31,246.00 in 1994, $29,875.00 in 1995 and
$19,783.50 through October 12,1996. (n 2 FOF; Tr. 78,110).
3. Mrs. Turner has chosen not to work full time although full time employment is available
at Veterans Hospital. Had she worked full time, Mrs. Turner could have made $33,693.00 at
Veterans Hospital in 1996. (TT 2 FOF; Tr. 80,111).
4. At the time of trial seven of the parties1 twelve children were residing in the family home
and attending school. Their ages at the time of trial were 18, 16, 14, 11, 9, 8 and 5. The other five
children are all adults and out of high school. (Tr. 113).
5. In the early 1970's, Mrs. Turner's parents made a gift to the parties of approximately 1/3
acre of ground located at 500 North 550 East, Heber City, Utah. In 1979, the parties built a home
on said property, (n 5 FOF).
6. The marital home had a fair market value of $199,500.00 as of the date of trial and a
mortgage balance against the home of approximately $29,500.00 leaving an equity of $170,000.00.
The monthly payment for the property is $499.20, which includes an escrow amount for taxes and
insurance, (n 6 FOF; Tr. 81).
7. In April, 1975, Mrs. Turner's parents incorporated Duke Farms, Inc. and gave each of
their children a 1/5 interest in said corporation. At the time of incorporation, there were 22.28 acres
and 17.5 shares of Wasatch Irrigation stock which comprised the assets of Duke Farms, Inc. (Tr. 18,
19,21,50,84,88).
8. When Duke Farms, Inc. was incorporated in 1975, the property was valued at $1,000 per
acre. (Tr. 82).
2

9. The value of the Wasatch Irrigation stock at the time of trial is $5,000 per share or
$87,500.00. (Tr. 88).
10. The 22.28 acres originally comprising the Duke Farms, Inc. property has been reduced
by the following:
A. A gift of approximately 1/3 acre to David and Di Ann Turner for construction of their
home; (Tr. 84).
B. A gift of approximately 1/3 acre to John Duke for construction of his home; (Tr. 48, 84).
C. A sale of approximately 4 acres to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and
(Tr. 48, 84).
D. A deed of a small portion of property to Heber City Municipal Corporation for which
Heber City has agreed to install a sidewalk and other improvements on the property at a later
date. (Tr. 122).
11. There is between 16.1 and 18.17 acres of property, which presently constitutes Duke
Farms, Inc. (Tr. 48, 85).
12. At the time of trial the property was appraised at $25,000.00 per acre or $454,250.00
although Mrs. Turner indicated she would not sell the property for that amount. (Tr. 50, 85).
13. During the course of the marriage, the parties have incurred the following indebtedness
which remained unpaid at the time of trial:
A. Mortgage indebtedness of $29,300.00; and, (Tr. 81).
B. USAA loan for Christmas and other family expenses of $11,600.00. (n 24 FOF;
Tr. 25).
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14. Mr. Turner was transferred to St. George, Utah in connection with his employment and
at the time of trial was living rent free in a fifth-wheel trailer pending purchase of a condominium.
Mr. Turner qualified and intended to purchase in December, 1996, a condominium in St. George,
Utah, for $85,000.00, which condominium will require a monthly payment of $797.00 and closing
costs of $1,668.00. (Tr. 26, 27,28, 30).
15. Mr. Turner's monthly expenses are as follows:
House payment
Food
Child Support
Telephone
Laundry & cleaning
Clothing
Medical
Dental
Utilities
Life insurance
Accident insurance
Bank card payment

Gifts
Hair
Attorney's fees
Car payment
Federal tax
State tax
FICA
FICAMD
TOTAL

$ 797.00
350.00
1,453.00
40.00
40.00
50.00
10.00
10.00
100.00
85.00
15.00
150.00
150.00
10.00
100.00
400.00
394.00
209.00
284.00
66.00
$4,713.00 (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4; Tr. 26-30).

16. Mr. Turner's has a negative cash flow of $252.00 per month based on his $4,461.00 per
month salary and $4,713.00 monthly expenses. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4; Tr. 26-30).
17. Mrs. Turner's monthly expenses are as follows:
House payment
Food
Clothes

$ 511.00
800.00
150.00

Medical/dental
Laundry
Heat
Electricity/gas
Sewer, water, garbage
Insurance
Loan payments
Recreation
Car payment
Drugs & cosmetics
Gifts
School & education
Telephone
Haircuts
Attorney's fees
Mandatory payroll deductions
OASDI tax
Medicare
Federal tax
State tax

TOTAL

80.00
10.00
57.00
60.00
50.00
105.00
20.00
100.00
400.00
30.00
25.00
30.00
50.00
50.00
100.00
67.00
16.00
75.00
44.00

$2,830.00 (n 20 FOF; Tr. 94,95; Plaintiffs Exh. 10).

18. Mrs. Turner has a positive monthly cash flow of $1,113.00 based on her monthly salary
of $2,490.00 and child support of $1,453.00 (total monthly income of $3,943.00) and her monthly
expenses of $2,830.00. (n 19, 20 FOF; Tr. 94, 95; Plaintiffs Exhibit 10).
19. The parties separated in June, 1995 and had been living apart for approximately 18
months at the time of trial. (Tr. 12).
VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Imputing Income to Mrs. Turner at $2,490.00 per month is proper in light of her $2,604.00
per month income in 1994, $2,490.00 per month income in 1995, $1,905.00 per month
income in 1996 working part-time. Mrs. Turner's attempt to reduce her work hours prior to
trial to 16 hours per week is unjustified inasmuch as full time work was readily available and
5

she worked 36 hours per week in 1995 and 32 hours per week in 1996 through September.
Using the children to justify spending more time at home is not justified on the basis the
parties had been separated for approximately 18 months at the time of trial and the minor
children are capable of helping at home. Appellant failed to marshall the evidence
supporting the Court's finding regarding the imputation of income issue.
B. The Court's child support award is based on the Uniform Child Support Guidelines and a
Child Support Obligation Worksheet admitted into evidence based on the respective incomes
of the parties. Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence in support of the child support
award and erroneously argued that the Child Support Worksheet was not filed in connection
with the Supplemental Decree of Divorce.
C. The trial Court properly denied alimony to Mrs. Turner based on her financial conditions and
needs, her incapacity or ability to produce income, the ability of Mr. Turner to provide
support and the length of the marriage. The Court's decision in this regard is supported by
appropriate findings which establish that Mrs. Turner has a positive cash flow of $1,112.00
per month and Mr. Turner has a negative cash flow of $252.00 per month. The Court's
decision not to award alimony is also based on Mrs. Turner's 20% interest in Duke Farms,
Inc. which has assets valued at $541,750.00. Mr. Turner was not awarded any interest in
Duke Farms, Inc. in the divorce action. Mrs. Turner failed to marshall the evidence relating
to the parties' income and expenses and the value of Duke Farms, Inc. in addressing the
alimony issue.
D. The Court properly awarded Mr. Turner his one-half interest in the family home. Allowing
Mrs. Turner the option of buying out Mr. Turner's interest in the home immediately or
6

selling the home and dividing the equity at a later date is fair and equitable. If Mrs. Turner
did not want Mr. Turner to benefit in the appreciation of the property or mortgage pay-down
she has the ability to refinance the marital home based on her considerable equity in the
marital home and her financial circumstances.
E. The Court's decision to equally divide the $11,600.00 USAA marital debt is clearly within
the Court's discretion. Mrs. Turner is in a much better position to pay the debt based on her
monthly cash flow.
F. The Court's awarding Mrs. Turner $1,650.00 for attorney's fees is based on a consideration
of the pertinent factors in making an attorney fees award and is further based on the Court's
making the requisite findings relating to the time expended, reasonableness of rates charged,
legal rates in the community for the type of work involved, the financial needs of the parties,
the issues raised in litigation and the $350.00 offset necessitated by Plaintiffs Motion to
Compel.
VII.
ARGUMENT
A.
MRS. TURNER HAS FAILED TO SATISFACTORILY
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR ON THE ISSUES
PRESENTED. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING SHOULD BE LEFT
UNDISTURBED.
The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the financial
interests of divorced parties and property and alimony awards will be upheld on
appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Bingham
v. Bingham, supra. Further, the appealing party has the burden to marshall all
7

evidence introduced at trial tending to support the court's finding and then
demonstrate that despite such evidence the Court's finding is so lacking support as
to be against the clear weight of the evidence. In Hagen v. Hagen. supra., the Court
in addressing the standard of review on appeal stated:
We will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact in a divorce proceeding
unless such findings are clearly erroneous. Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249,
1251 (Utah CtApp. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).
On appeal, it is the burden of the party seeking to overturn the trial court's
decision to "marshall the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus
making them 'clearly erroneous.'" In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886
(Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)); see
also Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465,468 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). 810 P.2d at
481
Mrs. Turner has failed to marshall the evidence in support of the Court's
decision on virtually all issues raised on appeal. Such failure will be addressed
separately in the following arguments.
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
IMPUTING INCOME TO MRS. TURNER.
Utah laws requires that prior to imputing income to a party in a divorce
action the Court must first find that the party is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed. Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.5(7)(a), which has been
applied in both child support and alimony cases, codifies this requirement and
provides:
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the
amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.

8

Contrary to Mrs. Turner's assertion, the trial court made a finding that Mrs.
Turner was voluntarily underemployed and even referred to the above quoted
section:
The Court finds that Defendant is employable, and able to work at a level
above which she is currently employed. The Court will therefore, impute
income to Defendant based on her historical earnings for 1995, or $2,490.00
per month. This is done in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 5 78-45-7.5(7)
(1996). (FOF 15 - Addendum A)

The question of what constitutes voluntary underemployment has been the
subject of considerable activity in the appellate courts in recent years. In Hall v.
HalL 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals explained that a
finding of voluntary underemployment must be based on a thorough appraisal of a
variety of factors, including the parties' abilities, employment capacity, earnings
potential and possible job openings available. In this case, the trial court considered
and weighed the above factors and determined that Mrs. Turner was voluntarily
underemployed. In this regard, FOF 2 (Addendum A) provides:
2. Defendant has degrees in both education and nursing, but has chosen not
to work full time outside the home. Her income from nursing was
$29,875.00 in 1995, and $19,783.50 through October 12,1996.
The testimony is undisputed that Mrs. Turner's income in 1994 was
$31,246.00 or $2,604.00 per month; her income in 1995 working a 36 hour week
was $29,875.00 or $2,490.00 per month; her income through October 12,1996
working part-time was $19,783.50 or $1,905.00 per month. Further, had she worked
full time in 1996 her income would have been $33,693.00 or $2,808.00 per month
9

and she just received a raise prior to trial. Mrs. Turner testified she could have
worked full time if she so desired. (Tr. 78-80,110-112). Mrs. Turner failed to
marshall this evidence in her brief.
Notwithstanding the income levels as set forth above, Mrs. Turner testified at
trial her income was $1,123.00 per month. To explain the discrepancy between her
yearly earnings in 1996 and her income calculation of $1,123.00 per month, Mrs.
Turner admitted that she cut her work hours to 16 hours per week less than two
months before trial. (Tr. 110).
Mrs. Turner justifies her use of the reduced monthly income by alleging that
there are seven children in the home to support and one of the teenage children
threatened suicide since the separation of the parties. The children of the parties are
all of school age. Jonathan was 18 at the date of trial and was scheduled to graduate
from high school at the conclusion of the then current school year. Katie was 16;
Robert was 14, Elizabeth was one month short of 12; Benjamin was 9; Gabriel was
8; and Nathan was one month short of 6. These children are old enough to help in
the home and Mrs. Turner can work more than 2 shifts per week. (Tr. 113; R. 8, 9)
The threat of suicide is a serious allegation, but does not justify working two
shifts or 16 hours per week. The suicide threat occurred approximately one year
prior to trial and shortly after the separation of the parties in June, 1995. There was
no testimony that the threat of suicide existed at the time of trial. If anything, Mrs.
Turner should be able to work more not less hours as the children grow older and the
children become accustomed to having their father not reside at home.
10

The record is clear that the trial court made the requisite finding under
U.C.A. 78-45-7.5(7)(a) that Mrs. Turner was voluntarily underemployed and there is
sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the Court's imputing income to Mrs.
Turner at her 1995 level.
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
COMPUTING THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD.
Defendant challenges the child support award on the basis that no Child
Support Worksheet was filed and the Court made inadequate findings. Such
arguments are false.
Plaintiffs Exhibit Six is a Child Support Obligation Worksheet which was
admitted as evidence in this case (Tr. 28, Addendum E). This Worksheet uses Mrs.
Turner's income of $2,490.00 per month and Mr. Turner's income of $4,461.00 per
month as found by the Court. (FOF 1 and 15 - Addendum A). Again, Mrs. Turner
has failed to marshall this evidence in her brief.
The Child Support Worksheet indicates that Mr. Turner's child support
obligation is $1,452.80 per month which is the amount ordered by the Court in FOF
16 (Addendum A) which provides:
16. Based on the incomes of the parties, child support will be set at
$1,452.80 per month.
The combined child support obligation table (Section 78-45-7.14) provides
combined child support obligations for up to six children. U.C.A. Section 78-457.7(4) provides:
For more than six children, additional amounts may be added to the base
child support obligation shown. Unless rebutted by Subsection 78-45-7.2(3),
11

the amount ordered shall not be less than the amount which would be
ordered for up to six children.
Mr. Turner explained how he calculated child support for seven children
when the Child Support Obligation table only goes up to six. Mr. Turner testified:
Q. And why have you calculated seven if you have six children under
eighteen?
A. I have a son that just turned eighteen, he will graduate from high school
in May and I feel like I need to take care of him through his graduation.
Q. The table for determining the amount of child support goes up to six
children, how did you calculate for seven?
A. I took the difference between five and six and added that same amount to
make up for the next column. (Tr. 29)

Mr. Turner's approach which was accepted by the Court is rational and in
accordance with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. Further, Mr. Turner is not
financially capable of providing additional child support and Mrs. Turner has more
than enough revenues each month to meet her monthly expenditures.

(See

Argument D below).
D. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
ALIMONY TO MRS. TURNER.
In Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the
well-settled standard for alimony in Utah. The Court stated:
The most important function of alimony is to provide support for the [spouse] as
nearly as possible at the standard of living she [or he] enjoyed during the marriage,
and to prevent the [spouse] from becoming a public charge. English v. English, 565
P.2d [409] at 411 (Utah 1977)... Three factors... must be considered in fixing a
reasonable alimony award:
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the [spouse seeking
support];
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[2] the ability of the [spouse seeking support] to produce a sufficient
income for [himself or] herself; and
[3] the ability of the [payor spouse] to provide support.
Courts have reiterated this legal standard on a regular basis in addressing alimony issues.
Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991), Thronson vT ThTOMPB, 810 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah App.
1991), Willev v. Willev. 333 Utah Adv. Rpt. 8 (Utah 9197), Hill v. Hill. 869 P.2d 963 (Utah App.
1993) and Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,12 (1994).
The 1995 Legislature codified the factors to consider in making an alimony determination.
Section 30-3-5(7)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, now provides:
The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipients1 earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
The Court referenced the foregoing statute and set forth the above four
factors in FOF 17 (Addendum A). The Court further cited Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d
96 (Utah 1986) wherein the Utah Supreme Court determined that "the purpose of
alimony is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and prevent that spouse from
becoming a public charge". Mrs. Turner's argument as it relates to the alimony
issue is that the Court failed to make appropriate findings. However, the Court's
Memorandum Decision clearly establishes that the appropriate findings were made.
With respect to the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, the Court
made the following findings:
19. When imputing income to Defendant at her 1995 level, Defendant has a
13

gross monthly income for herself and the children, after receiving child
support, of $3,942.80. Gross income was compared in this case since
the Court did not have tax figures for Defendant.
20. Defendant has listed her monthly expenses as $2,830.00.
21. The Court will decline to award alimony in this case. Considering the
respective incomes of the parties, and the ability of Defendant to
produce income, alimony is not needed to allow her to maintain the
standard of living she enjoyed while married, or to keep her from
becoming a public charge. (Addendum A)
Based on the foregoing findings, Mrs. Turner has a positive monthly cash
flow of $1,112.00 per month. Further, had the Court not imputed income to Mrs.
Turner but used her monthly income in 1996 she still would have a positive monthly
cash flow of $527.44.
$1,904.64
+$1.452.80
$3,357.44
-$2.83Q,QQ
$ 527.44

1996 Monthly income
Child Support
Subtotal
Expenses
POSITIVE MONTHLY CASH FLOW

The second factor is Mrs. Turner's earning capacity or ability to produce
income. As set forth above, the Court made findings that Defendant has degrees in
both education and nursing, her income from nursing was $29,875.00 in 1995 and
$19,783.50 through October 12,1996. (FOF 2 - Addendum A). The Court also
found that Defendant is employable and able to work at a level above which she is
currently employed and imputed income at her historical earnings for 1995 of
$2,490.00 per month. (FOF 15 - Addendum A).
The third factor considered by the Court is the ability of Mr. Turner to
provide support. In this regard, the Court found that Mr. Turner earned $4,461.00
14

per month and has a gross monthly income after paying child support of $3,008.20.
(FOF 1,18- Addendum A) Further, Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 was received by the Court
which sets forth Mr. Turner's monthly income and expense and shows a negative
cash flow of $252.00 per month.
The last factor considered by the Court is the length of marriage. The parties
were married on March 18,1966. The Court obviously considered this factor in not
awarding alimony as it set forth this factor as a consideration. Long term marriages
do not mean alimony should be paid when the other factors dictate otherwise. It
only means that if alimony is justified, it should continue for a longer period.
It is well established in Utah that alimony awards should to the extent
possible equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a
level as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.
Howell v, HowdL 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App 1991); Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d
1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones, sma; Higlev v. Higlev. 676 P2d 379, 381
(Utah 1983). In Howell, supra. Judge Bench in his concurring opinion indicated that
the alimony award should not reduce the standard of living of the paying spouse
below that of the receiving spouse:
The alimony award, however, need not be large enough to maintain the receiving
spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage if that amount of
alimony would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse below that of the
receiving spouse. Alimonv mav onlv raise the standard of living of the receiving
spouse until it is roughly equal to that of the paying spouse. It is in this sense that
alimony should seek "to the extent possible, [to] equalize the parties1 respective postdivorce living standards." Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah
Ct.App.1988) (Emphasis added) 806 P.2d at 1216.
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The Court specifically found that "alimony is not needed to allow her [Mrs.
Turner] to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed while married". Mr. Turner's
standard of living is already below the standard of living of Mrs. Turner and alimony
is certainly not justified.
Even if the trial court had not made the appropriate findings, the alimony
award should not be reversed or remanded. In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. supra..
the husband claimed the trial court abused its discretion in awarding his wife
$800.00 per month alimony because it failed to make findings regarding the wife's
need. Addressing this issue the Court of Appeals stated:
When the trial court has failed to make findings on the three factors listed
above, we reverse, unless pertinent facts in the record are clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018,1025 (Utah App. 1993); Howell,
806 P.2d at 1213. So long as the record is clear that the trial court has
considered these three factors, we will not disturb its determination regarding
alimony unless it has clearly abused its discretion. 875 P.2d at 602
The record is abundantly clear that the Court considered the appropriate
factors in denying alimony.
The Court also considered Mrs. Turner's interest in Duke Farms, Inc. in
denying an alimony award.. The Court made the following finding:
22. The Court has also taken into account Defendant's interest in Duke
Farms, Inc., in deciding not to award alimony. The court in Mortensen,
supra, stated: "The fact that one spouse has inherited or donated
property, particularly if it is income producing, may properly be
considered as eliminating or reducing the need for alimony by that
spouse..." at 308. (Addendum A)
The case of Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (1988) is the landmark
case in Utah as it relates to how a court should allocate inherited or gifted property in
16

a divorce proceeding. The Court rejected Mr. Turner's claim that he should have
received part of his wife's interest in Duke Farms, Inc. based on his efforts in
watering and putting up hay on the property. However, the Court appropriately
considered Mrs. Turner's interest in the property as a factor in deciding whether
alimony is needed. As set forth above, Defendant has a 20% interest in Duke Farms,
Inc. or 20% of an asset valued at $454,250.00 plus water stock of $87,500.00.
Accordingly, Mrs. Turner's interest in Duke Farms, Inc. is $108,350.00. This is
based on a per acre price of $25,000.00 and Mrs. Turner adamantly testified she
would not sell the property for that price. (Tr. 85).
Mrs. Turner failed to marshall the evidence relating to the parties incomes
and expenses and the value of Duke Farms, Inc. in addressing the alimony issue.
E. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF MR. TURNER'S
INTEREST IN THE MARTIAL HOME WAS PROPER.

The trial court determined that the martial home was valued $199,500.00 and
had a mortgage at the time of trial of $29,500.00. (FOF 6 - Addendum A). The
Court determined that the equity in the martial residence, both land and
improvements, should be divided evenly between the parties. (FOF 7 - Addendum
A). The Court awarded Mrs. Turner possession of the marital residence, including
all debt thereon, until such time as the parties' youngest child reaches the age of 18,
or graduates from high school, whichever occurs later, or until Mrs. Turner
remarries, cohabitates with a member of the opposite sex, or dies. (FOF 9 Addendum A). Mrs. Turner objected to the Court's original Supplemental Decree of
17

Divorce resulting in a Supplemental Memorandum Decision wherein the Court
made the following additional findings relating to the marital home:
1. Defendant has objected to Plaintiffs proposed division of the parties'
marital home. Specifically, Defendant objects that if the home is sold at
a future date, and the equity divided at that time, then Plaintiff will
benefit from Defendant's pay-down of the mortgage. Conversely, it
could potentially be another 12 years before the marital home is sold. It
would be patently unfair to tie up Plaintiffs equity for that time without
providing some sort of compensation. Further, Defendant has the
benefit of the use of the home until it is sold.
2. This Court, therefore, will order that the martial home be sold upon the
happening of one of the events outlined in the Memorandum Decision,
and equity in the home divided at that time, with each party receiving
half. If Defendant wishes to prevent Plaintiff from benefiting from
Defendant's pay-down of the mortgage, Defendant can choose to buy
out Plaintiffs interest in the home; however, the Defendant will have
one year from the date of the signing of the Supplemental Decree of
Divorce in which to decide whether or not she wants to buy out Plaintiff,
and make a substantial effort to do so. In either case, the value of
Plaintiffs interest in the home will be determined by taking one-half the
equity in the home at the time Plaintiff is paid out, and not the equity that
existed on the date of trial. (Addendum B).
Mrs. Turner now argues that it is unfair and inequitable for Turner to benefit
from her pay-down of the mortgage or the appreciation of the home pending
occurrence of one of the triggering events described in the Supplemental Divorce
Decree. She further argues that she is prevented from financing her home to pay Mr.
Turner's equity based on the Court's failing to award her alimony or additional child
support.
At the time of trial there was an equity in the marital home of $170,000.00 of
which Mr. Turner's share is $85,000.00. The Court gave Mrs. Turner the option of
paying off Mr. Turner's equity or waiting until the home is sold. Further, the Court
18

gave the parties the option of offsetting their interest in the other parties' retirement
against the equity in the home.
The parties, at their option, may offset their respective interests in the other's
retirement against the equity in the home, or make other arrangements as
they desire in order to avoid the additional paperwork of obtaining a
qualified domestic relations order. (FOF 14 - Addendum A).
If Mrs. Turner wanted to reap the benefits of her mortgage pay-down and
any appreciation on the property, she could have refinanced the home and paid off
Mr. Turner his $64,416.00 equity after offsetting the retirement plans. Her total
indebtedness would have been $93,916.00 on a home appraised at $199,500.00 and
her principal and interest payment on a 30 year loan would have been less than
$700.00 per month on an eight percent loan. (See Amortization Table-Addendum F)
This would have resulted in an increased mortgage payment of less than $200.00 per
month which Mrs. Turner could easily afford based on her income and expenses as
set forth above. Again, Mrs. Turner failed to marshall the evidence regarding the
home value, indebtedness and right to offset retirement values.
F. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DIVIDED THE
USAA DEBT EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
The Court made the following finding with respect to the USAA debt:
23. The USAA loan in the amount of $11,600.00 is marital debt. As such, it
should be divided with each party being responsible for paying
$5,800.00 towards the debt. (Addendum A).
In Boyle v. Boyle. 735 P.2d 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) the Court stated:
This Court will refrain from disturbing findings of the trial court in a divorce
action unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Searle v. Searle, 522
P.2d 697 (Utah 1974). The trial court is clearly in the best position to weigh
the evidence, determine credibility and arrive at factual conclusions. In this
19

case the trial judge considered all evidence presented as to the marital assets
and debts as they existed prior to and during the marriage, and subsequent to
the separation of the parties. It would be inappropriate for this Court to
reverse on an isolated item of property or debt distribution. Rather, this
Court must examine the entire distribution to determine if the trial court
abused its discretion. 735 P.2d at 670
Mrs. Turner argues that the Court should require Mr. Turner to pay the
US AA debt in its entirety but fails to indicate the debt was incurred for marital
purposes and she is in a better position to pay the debt based on her monthly cash
flow.
G. THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD WAS PROPERLY MADE.

It is well established that the decision to award attorney's fees, and the amount of such fees
is within the trial court's discretion. Rappleye v. Rappleye. 855 P.2d 260,265 (Utah App. 1993).
Further, a party seeking attorney's fees in a divorce action must present evidence which establishes
the financial need of the requesting party and demonstrates the reasonableness of the amount of the
award. Munns v. Munns. 790 P.2d 116,122 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Judge Maetani entered the
following findings as it relates to the issue of attomey's fees and costs:
26. In determining the appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees the Court considers
the following factors specified in Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984); cited in
Huckv.Huck. 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986), and in Talley v. Talley. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah
App. 1987):
a. Necessity of the number or hours dedicated by the attorney;
b. reasonableness of the rate charged;
c. rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the community; and,
d. financial need of the requesting party.
27. Defendant is requesting attorney's fees in the amount of $4,096.00. Plaintiff has
requested that each party pay their own attorney fees, but that Plaintiff be awarded
$350.00 in connection to a Motion to Compel.
28. The Court finds that each attorney in this case has expended a reasonable amount of
time, and has charged a rate that is in accordance with the going rates in the community
for this type of work.
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29. The Plaintiff in this action has caused some increase in attorney's fees by
pressing an unreasonable claim for the assets of Duke Farms, Inc. The Coiirt
will award Defendant $2,000 in attorney's fees and costs, and offset that amount
by the $350 necessitated by Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. The total award of
attorney's fees to be paid to Defendant by Plaintiff is therefore $1,650.00.
(Addendum A).
The trial court is much better suited to determine reasonable attorney's fees than an
appellate court. Willey v. Willey. supra. Accordingly, the trial court's decision in awarding
attorney's fees should be affirmed and Mr. Turner should be awarded his attorney's fees and
costs on appeal.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Turner has failed to meet her burden, as one challenging findings of fact, to
marshall all evidence introduced at trial that supports the Court's findings and then
demonstrate that regardless of that support of evidence, the trial court's factual
determination is against the clear weight of the evidence. Absent such a complete
presentation of these supported evidence, the appellate court is bound to accept the trial
court's findings which clearly establish:
(1) Mrs. Turner's income was properly imputed at $2,490.00 per month based on
her historical earnings for 1995;
(2) The child support award was computed properly in accordance with the
Uniform Child Support Guidelines and supported by a properly prepared Child
Support Obligation Worksheet;
(3) The trial court properly denied alimony to Mrs. Turner based on her financial
condition and needs, her earning capacity or ability to produce income and the
ability of Mr. Turner to provide support;
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(4) The trial court properly determined Mr. Turner's interest in the martial home inasmuch
as Mrs. Turner was given the option to pay Mr. Turner his equity immediately or
postpone payment until one of the triggering events provided for in the Supplemental
Decree of Divorce; and
(5) The division of the USAA debt and attorney's fees award was properly made.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of March, 1998.

Terry L. Christiansen
ADKINS & CHRISTIANSEN, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee, were
mailed, postage prepaid, to Steven Kuhnhausen, Joseph F. Orifici, Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant, 450 South 900 East, Suite 240, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, on this
day
of March, 1998.

Terry L.Christiansen
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASATCH, STATE OF UTAH

MELVON DAVID TURNER,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
v.
DI ANN CAROL TURNER,
Defendant.

Case No. 954400098
Judge Howard H. Maetani

This matter came before the Court for trial on November 21, 1996, before the
Honorable Howard H. Maetani, District Court Judge. Plaintiff Melvon David Turner was
present and represented by counsel Terry L. Christiansen. Defendant Di Ann Carol Turner
was present and represented by counsel Mary C. Corporon. The Court heard argument, and
granted parties 10 days to submit their proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Said documents were received by the Court from both Plaintiff and Defendant on or about
December 20, 1996. Plaintiff submitted Objections to the proposed Findings on or about
December 26, 1996. Defendant submitted Objections to the proposed Findings on or about
January 6, 1997. The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, considered the exhibits
and arguments of counsel, reviewed the submitted documents, and being fully advised in the
premises now makes the following:
MEMORANDUM DECISION

A. Findings of Fact

1.

Plaintiff is employed at the Utah Department of Employment Security at the

rate of $53,534.00 per year, or $4,461.00 per month.
2.

Defendant has degrees in both education and nursing, but has chosen not to

work full time outside the home. Her income from nursing was $29,875.00 in 1995, and
$19/78") 50 through Oiiribei 12, J0%»
Duke Family Farm
3.

1 he Defendant has acquired an interest in Duke Farms, Inc. Ilie Coui t finds

that this property was given to Defendant as a gift from her family. The court in Bingham v.
Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994), stated:
trial courts should generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and
inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to
that spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an
equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity
lost through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has
made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse.
at 1068-1069 (quoting Monensi m \ Mi memi m., 760 P.2d 304 308 ( ( Jtah 1988).
4.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has performed some work on Duke Farms, Inc.

The work done by Plaintiff, however, did nothing to enhance, maintain, or protect the present
value of the land. Furthermore, the property has not been consumed, commingled, or given
as a gift to Plaintiff. Under the Mortensen test, Plaintiff fails to establish an interest in Duke
Farms, and any interest therein acquired by the Defendant during the marriage is the sole
property of Defendant.

Marital Home
2

5.

In the early 1970's, Defendant's parents made a gift to the parties of

approximately 1/3 acre of ground located at 500 North 550 East, Heber City, Utah. In 1979,
the parties built a home on said property.
6.

The value of the entire marital residence, land and improvements included, is

$199,500.00. The land on which the residence sits is alone valued at $42,000.00. There is a
current mortgage against the home of approximately $29,500.00.
7.

The Court finds that the equity in the marital residence, both land and

improvements, is to be divided evenly between the parties.
8.

The Court finds the land upon which the residence sits to be a gift to the

marriage, intended for the use and enjoyment of both parties.

The parties were married a

substantial length of time before they received the land, and there is no evidence at trial that
the land was intended to be a gift solely to Defendant. Also, Plaintiff has expended a
substantial amount of time and effort maintaining, enhancing, and protecting the value of the
property, therefore meeting the standard set forth in Moriensen, supra. Furthermore, as stated
by the court in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987), a trial court has "broad discretion .
. . in the division of property, regardless of its source or time of acquisition." at 134-135.
9.

Defendant is awarded possession of the marital residence, including all debt

thereon, until such time as the parties' youngest child reaches the age of 18, or graduates from
high school, whichever occurs later, or until Defendant remarries, cohabitates with a member
of the opposite sex, or dies.
Automobiles
y/

10.

Each party is awarded the automobile that is currently in their possession,

3

including all deb! atul equity associated therewith.
ty7 Retirement Benefits
11.

Plauiliff has ,i ifliitMiicii! pi an

|HII?»IJIIIII

to Ins employment wild a t ;isli value of

$50,300.00 as of September 30, 1996.
12.

Defendant has a retirement plan with a cash value of $9,133.00

13.

The retirement plans are marital property, and should be divided, with each

party taking a one-half interest in the retirement plan of the other.
14.

The parties, at their option, may offset their respective interests in the other's

retirement against the equity in the home, or make other arrangements as they desire in order
to avoid the nklifioiial papei voui ol obtaining a qualified (lonnm 1m n Lillians aider.
Child Support
15.

1 he Coiii t: f inds that Defendant is employable, and able to >A orl : at a level

above which she is currently employed. The Court will therefore, impute income to
Defendant based on her historical earnings for 1995, or $2,490.00 per month. This is done in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(7) (1996).
/

16.

Based on the incomes of the parties, child support will be set at $1452.80 per

month.
Alimony
17.

Ulah I ode An i <"? tO-J.'i |)M'M"»| stair, HI iintm ml pail lli.il flu1" < uuil must

consider the following factors in determining alimony:
(i)

the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;

(ii)

the recipient spouse's earning capacity or ability to produce income,

I

(iii)

the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and

(iv)

the length of the marriage.

See U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(a) (Supp. 1995).
In Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court determined that
the purpose of alimony is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and prevent that spouse from becoming a
public charge.
18.

In the present case, Plaintiff has a gross monthly income, after paying child

support, of $3,008.20.
19.

When imputing income to Defendant at her 1995 level, Defendant has a gross

monthly income for herself and the children, after receiving child support, of $3,942.80.
Gross income was compared in this case since the Court did not have tax figures for
Defendant.
20.

Defendant has listed her monthly expenses as $2,830.00.

21.

The Court will decline to award alimony in this case Considering the

respective incomes of the parties, and the ability of Defendant to produce income, alimony is
not needed to allow her to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed while married, or to
keep her from becoming a public charge.
22.

The Court has also taken into account Defendant's interest in Duke Farms, Inc.,

in deciding not to award alimony. The court in Mortensen, supm, stated: "The fact that one
spouse has inherited or donated property, particularly if it is income producing, may properly
be considered as eliminating or reducing the need for alimony by that spouse . . ." at 308.

5

1) S A A and Appraisal Debt
t//

23.

The appraisal cost incurred by Plaintiff for the marital home is $300. The

parlies should split the covl n4 (lie appimsui <Mlli caili p,iyiii|> 1>lir*0.
24.

The USAA loan in the amount of $11,600.00 is marital debt. As such, it

should be divided with each party being responsible for paying $5,800.00 towai ds the debt.
25.

Each party will maintain possession of their own bank accounts, and all monies

therein.
/
26.

Attorney's Fees and Costs

In determining the appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees the Court

* uiLsi*,l*li«» tin' lallnu'ini; factois specified ID Beals v. Seals. 68 ! P }d 862 (Utah 10K4 I, cited in
Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986), and in Tallev v. Tallev. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App.
198 7):

27.

a.

necessity of the number or hours dedicated by the attorney;

b.

reasonableness of the rate charged;

c.

rates con imonly chai ged for divorce actions in the community, and

d.

financial need of the requesting party.

Defei idant is i equesting attorney's fees in flic ainnunl ol \\ 096 00

Phiiiliff

has requested that each party pay their own attorney fees, but that Plaintiff be awarded $350
in connection to a Motion to Compel.
28.

The Court finds that each attorney in this case has expended a reasonable

amount of time, and has charged a rate that is in accordance with the going rates in the
cnrimiumlv loi this typt* *d" ' vork.

6

29.

The Plaintiff in this action has caused some increase in attorney's fees by

pressing an unreasonable claim for the assets of Duke Farms, Inc. The Court will award
Defendant $2,000 in attorney's fees and costs, and offset that amount by the $350 necessitated
by Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. The total award of attorney's fees to be paid to Defendant
by Plaintiff is therefore $1,650.00.
Conclusions of Law
'

1.

Plaintiff shall take no interest in the property known as Duke Farms, Inc.
The marital residence, both land and improvements, are property of the

marriage, and the equity therein shall be evenly divided.
Each party is awarded the automobile currently in their possession, including
all equity.
( / 4.

Each party will take a one-half interest in the retirement plan amounts of the

other party.
*5.

Child support is set at $1,452.80 paid to Defendant by Plaintiff each month.

>/ 6.

No alimony shall be awarded in this case.

\/l.

The Debt known as the U.S.A.A. loan shall be evenly divided, with each party

owing one half the debt.
v/8.

Each party will pay one half the cost for the appraisal of the marital home.

*/9.

Each party will maintain possession of their respective bank accounts, and all

monies therein.
10.

Defendant is awarded attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $1,650.00.

11.

All other issues now before the Court have been resolved pursuant to the above

7

Findings of Fact which are, by this reference, fully incorporated herein as the Court's
Conclusions of Law
12.

The Decree of Divorce should be modified in conformity with the foregoing.

13.

Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare an Order consistent with the foregoing, and

siibniii 1 Mi lIn1 fVniff (fur signature

Dated this

day of February, 1997.
BY m i . COURT:

—HOWARD H. MAETANI
District Court Judge
Mary C. Corporon
Terry L. Christiansen
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASATCH, STATE OF UTAH

MEL VON DAVID TURNER,

SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

v.
DI ANN CAROL TURNER,
Defendant.

Case No. 954400098
Judge Howard H. Maetani

This matter came before the Court for trial on November 21, 1996, before the
Honorable Howard H. Maetani, District Court Judge. Plaintiff Melvon David Turner was
present and represented by counsel Terry L. Christiansen. Defendant Di Ann Carol Turner
was present and represented by counsel Mary C. Corporon. The Court heard argument, and
granted parties 10 days to submit their proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Said documents were received by the Court from both Plaintiff and Defendant on or about
December 20, 1996. Plaintiff submitted Objections to the proposed Findings on or about
December 26, 1996. Defendant submitted Objections to the proposed Findings on or about
January 6, 1997. The Court issued a Memorandum Decision on February 13, 1997,
instructing counsel for Plaintiff to prepare a Supplemental Decree of Divorce, and submit it to
the Court for signature. The Court received the Supplemental Decree from Plaintiff on or
about April 14, 1997. Defendant submitted an Objection to the Supplemental Decree on or
about April 18, and Plaintiff submitted a Response to Objection on April 23. The Court,

*

"g

fully advised in the premises now makes the following:
SUIMMOMENTAL MEMORANDUM DECISION
A. Findings of Fact
1.

Defendant has objected to Plaintiffs proposed division of the parties marital

home. Specifically, Defendant objects that if the home is sold at a future date, and the equity
divided at that time, then Plaintiff will benefit from Defendant's pay-down of the mortgage.
Conversely, il eoult! pnlciifinlly he another 1? y< Jir: hH'nn1 lln' marilal home is .sold

fl would

be patently unfair to tie up Plaintiffs equity for that time without providing some sort of
compensation
2.

:
This Court, therefore, will order that the marital home be sold upon the

happening of one of the events outlined in the Memorandum Decision, and equity in the
home divided at that time, with each party receiving half. If Defendant wishes to prevent
Plaintiff from benefiting from Defendant's pay-down of the mortgage, Defendant can choose

the date of the signing of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce in which to decide whether or
not she wants to buy out Plaintiff, ami make .i substantial cfToi! lo do so

111] .'illit'i utse, lite

value of Plaintiffs interest in the home will be determined by taking one-half the equity in the
home at the time Plaintiff is paid out, and not the equity that existed on the date of trial.
3.

Defendant objected to Plaintiffs disposition of the retirement accounts. It is

this Court's order that the retirement accounts be divided based on their value at the time of
trial

HIP parties should cxdiarwe this information wifiiiii Ml \\\\

2

IK lln1 parties cannot

agree on the mechanics of the division, then each party will prepare, at their own expense, a
qualified domestic relations order to obtain their interest in the other's retirement account
4.

Also absent from Plaintiffs Supplemental Decree of Divorce was the Court's

ruling on attorney's fees. The Court awarded attorney's fees and costs to Defendant in the
amount of $1,650.00.
5.

The foregoing Supplemental Memorandum Decision should be incorporated

into this Court's prior Memorandum Decision. In all other respects, Plaintiffs Supplemental
Decree of Divorce is in accordance with this Court's intentions.
6.

Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare another Supplemental Decree of Divorce in

accordance with the above, and submit it to the Court for signature.
Dated this A f

day of April, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

^fouu2jjic
HOWARD Hr-MAETANI
District Court Judge
cc:
Mary C. Corporon
Terry L. Christiansen
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ADDENDUM C
Terry L. Christiansen (#0654)
ADKINS & CHRISTIANSEN, P.C.
P.O. Box 680284
Park City, Utah 84068
Telephone: (801) 649-9061
Attorneys for Plaintiff

^

.Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIA1 » DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MELVON DAVID TURNER,

)

Plaintiff,

)

j s

•

SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE

)

Dl ANN CAROL TURNER,

)

Case N o . 954400098DA

Defendant.

)

Judge:

Howard H. Maetani

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT for trial on
November 21, 1:996, before the Honorable Howar c:i 11
Court Judge,

Maetani, District

Plaintiff appeared in person and by and through his

counsel of record, Terry L. Christiansen and defendant appeared in
person and by and through her counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon.
The court having heard the testimony of witnesses, reviewed the
exhibits and considered the arguments and proposed Findings of Fact:
and

Conclusions

of

Law

and

objections

counsel, and having resolved the issues

thereto

filed

by

remaining after

pursuant to its Memorandum Decisi on dated

both
trial

I lary 1 3 , ] 99 7. whi eh

set forth the Court r s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
the issues in dispute, and further having resolved the objection to
the Supplemental

Decree ol Mivorce purssudiif

1 '" ii t:« .'.iupplemental

Memorandum Decision dated April 29, 1997, based thereon and for
good cause appearing;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. The Decree of Divorce heretofore executed on December 18,
1996, is modified herein.
2.

Plaintiff

is awarded a decree of divorce from the

defendant upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same
to become final and effective immediately upon being signed by the
Judge and entered by the clerk of the court.
3.

Defendant is awarded the temporary and permanent care,

custody and control of the parties' minor children, subject to,
plaintiff's reasonable and liberal rights of visitation. Plaintiff
is awarded visitation with the children of the parties as agreed
upon between the parties, and in the event that they are unable to
agree, then visitation shall be according to the schedule of
visitation set forth at Utah Code Ann., §30-3-35.
plaintiff's

visitation

with

the

parties1

children

Further,
shall

be

conditioned as follows:
a. plaintiff shall give notice to defendant twenty-four
hours in advance if he intends actually to exercise the
visitation with the children; and
b.

plaintiff shall exercise visitation with all of the

minor children together, as a group, on at least one of his
visitations per month. The remaining visitations may be with
fewer than all of the remaining minor children, but this shall
be conditioned such that if he takes fewer than all of the
children for one visit, the next occasion when he takes fewer
than all of the children he shall take some or all of the
2

children

whu

Lid not

pa filieipat e

nil Lhe

last episode

of

visitation; and
c.

plaintiff may exercise visitation by coming to the

home of the defendant and knocking on the door of the home to
seek entry.

He may come into the home to wait

for

the

ch i ldren wh id e they are getting' ready for visitation, bi it: he
may not wander about the premises., and shall remain in. the
living room area; and
d.•

p 1, a i n t;1 f f wi 11

schedul e

\ :i s :i t at io ri t hroug h

defendant directly and not with the minor children, unless
defendant

is

not

reasonably

available

to

schedule

the

"v is i tat ion.
3 . Plaintiff shall pay child support to defendant in the sum
of $1,452.80 each month.
I

Plainti ff si ial 1 rnai ntaii I his cuireni

1,ife insurance <,ui his

own li fe naming all of the children of the parties as the sole
primary beneficiaries of that insurance until the youngest child of
the parties has achieved the age of eighteen years or graduated
from high school in due course.
5.
coverage
parties

Plaintiff shall maintain health and accident
as

it

is available

are ordered

insurance

to him through employment.

to share equally

in any medical,

Both
dental,

orthodontic, optometric or psychotherapeutic expenses incurred for
the benefit of the children not covered by plaintiff's policy of
health insurance, and each shall hold the other harmless on onehalf of an] r si i ::h obi igations .

fi; lie

6.

Plaintiff shall be permitted to claim the children of the

parties, Katie, Elizabeth and Gabriel, as dependents for purposes
of calculating his. federal and state income taxation, so long as he
is current in his total family support obligation to the defendant
at the conclusion of any tax year in which the minor children are
to be so claimed.

In any event, defendant shall be permitted to

claim the children of the parties, Robert, Benjamin and Nathan, as
dependents for purposes of calculating her federal and state income
taxation.
7.
8.

No alimony is awarded in this action.
The parties' previous

division

of

their household

furnishings and fixtures and personal clothing and effects, is
confirmed in each, and each party is awarded those items currently
in his or her possession, without financial set off from the other
party.
9.

Plaintiff is awarded the 240 Volvo, free and clear of any

claim of the defendant, subject to the indebtedness incurred
thereon which plaintiff shall pay and assume and shall hold the
defendant harmless thereon.

Defendant is awarded the 740 Volvo,

free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff, subject to the
indebtedness thereon which the defendant shall pay and assume and
shall hold the plaintiff harmless thereon.
L0.

Each party is awarded his or her own personal banking

accounts, free and clear of any interest of the other party,
without further contribution or set off from the other party.
11.

Each party is ordered to pay one-half of the $11,600.00
4

USAA indebtedness.
12.

Each party is ordered to pay and assume any debts or
.

with v::r date

,;

.

;.:r.i;

JL

aer

^h^

own

commencing effective

name

complaint

for divorce

in this

action, and each shall hold the other harmless thereon.
Each [Dart- wiJl pay $]S0,nn n\

M

l

fil00.no nosf; for the

appraisal of the marital home.
14.
F'arnifrj,

Defendant is awarded all of the parties1 interest in Duke

Inc.; .

15.

Each party is awarded a one-half (1/2) interest in the

home and real property located at 500 North 550 East, Heber City,
Utah, wh.if,.:li piopert / is more particulai: J,) < JV aci ibcd a;* t'ol 1 ows:
BEG 648.42 FT W & 8.25 RD S OF SE COR NWl/4 SEC 32, T3S,
R5E, SLM; E 145 FT; N 105 FT; W 145 FT; S 105 FT TO BEG.
AREA 0.35 ACRE
Defendant is awarded possession of said home and real property, and
is ordered to pay all debt thereon, until the fir st occurrence of
any of the following events:
a.

when s a i d home i s so ] d;

b.

when the parties1 youngest e m Id reaches the age of

eighteen (18) or graduates from-high school, which ever occurs
later;
c.

when defendant remarries, co-habitats with a person

of the opposite sex, or dies;
d.

when defendant shal] cease t:.i i use sad d home HIS her

primary residence for a continuous period of more than three
(3) months; or,
5

e.

at any other time prior to any of the foregoing

events in defendant's sole discretion.
Upon the first occurrence of any of the foregoing events, the
home will be immediately sold and the net equity evenly divided by
the parties at that time with each party receiving half. Provided,
however, if defendant wishes to prevent Plaintiff from benefiting
from Defendant's pay-down of the mortgage, Defendant can choose to
buy out Plaintiff's interest in the home; however, the Defendant
will have one year from the date of the signing of the Supplemental
Decree of Divorce in which to decide whether or not she wants to
buy out Plaintiff, and make a substantial effort to do so.

In

either case, the value of Plaintiff's interest in the home will be
determined by taking one-half the equity in the home at the time
Plaintiff is paid out, and not the equity that existed on the date
of trial.
16.

Each party is prohibited from placing or causing to be

placed any lien, mortgage or any other encumbrance against the home
and property described in paragraph 15 above.
17.

Defendant is awarded her retirement plan with a cash

value of $9,133.00 free and clear of any claim of plaintiff.
18.

Plaintiff is awarded his retirement plan through the

State of Utah with Traveler's Insurance subject to Defendant's
$21,016.01 interest therein.

Defendant shall be required at her

sole expense to have prepared, filed with and executed by the Court
any necessary qualified domestic relations order required by plan
administrators to receive or separate her $21,016.01 interest.
6

19.

Defendant is awarded $1,650.00 for attorney's fees and

costs incurred herein.
20.

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver all

necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership or perfect
the liens of the property of the parties pursuant to this decree.
DATED this

day of

^rUPfs<* y

1997.

BY THE COURT:

^^C^t^C,
IOWARD <MAgIANI
Districtcourt Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Supplemental Decree of Divorce was mailed, postage prepaid, to Mary
C. Corporon, CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P^C., 808 East South Temple, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102, on this [4*- day of May, 1997.

7

ADDENDUM D

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Respondent
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, PC.
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)328-1162

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MELVON DAVID TURNER,

ORDER ON OBJECTION TO SUPPLEMENTAL
DECREE OF DIVORCE, MOTION TO CORRECT
CLERICAL ERROR, AND RULE 52 AND Rule
55 MOTIONS

Petitioner,
-vs-

Case No. 954400098DA

Dl ANN CAROL TURNER,
Judge Howard Maetani
Respondent.

THE RESPONDENTS OBJECTION to supplemental decree of divorce, her motion
to correct clerical error, and her motions pursuant to Rule 52 and 59 having come before
the court for hearing, pursuant to a telephone conference, each party appearing by and
through his or her respective counsel of record, and the court having ruled upon the
pending motions, based thereon and for good cause appearing;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
The respondent's motions to correct the supplemental decree of divorce and

objection to the supplemental decree of divorce, and her motions pursuant to Rule 52 and
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are granted. Specifically, paragraphs 17 and 18
of the supplemental decree of divorce shall be amended as follows:
17.
Each party is ordered to share equally in defendant's retirement plan
through her employment pursuant to the Woodward formula, one-half to each.
Defendant is ordered to prepare a qualified domestic relations order distributing this
retirement plan to the defendant, and to bear the expenses of that qualified
domestic relations order. The date at which separation of the plans should be
effective is the date of trial, November 21,1996.
18.
All plaintiffs retirement plans through the State of Utah, or his other
employment, including the retirement plan with Traveler's Insurance, shall be
divided equally between the parties, according to the Woodward formula, one-half
to each. Defendant shall prepare at her sole expense, a qualified domestic
relations order as necessary to accomplish this distribution of this retirement plan
or plans. The date at which separation of the plans should be effective is the date
of trial, November 21,1996.
With the exception of this correction, respondent's motions are denied. The supplemental
decree of divorce is deemed to be modified, amended and corrected to include the
foregoing paragraphs 17 and 18, effective with the date of this order. With this exception,
the supplemental decree of divorce previously entered herein shall remain in full force and
effect.
DATED THIS

X\k

day of

^ w C
BY THE COURT:

HOWARD MAETANI
District Court Judge

1997.

CERTIFICATE QF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be mailed to:
TERRY L CHRISTIANSEN
Attorney for Petitioner
P.O. Box 680284
Park City, Utah 84068

on the IX

day of. QjlCJuf'. 1997.

rtarv
Secretary

/

ADDENDUM E
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MELVON DAVID TURNER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY)
C i v i l N o . 9 5 4 4 0 0 0 9 8 DA

DI ANN CAROL TURNER,
Defendant.

MOTHER

FATHER

seven (7)

| 1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this
| mother and father for whom support is to be awarded.
$2,490.00

$4,461.00

-0-

-0-

1 2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not
| enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 1).

-0-

-o-

| 2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the
| Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent.

-0-

-0-

1 3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c and 2d from 2a. This is the
1 Adjusted Gross Income for child support purposes.

$2,490.00

$4,461.00

1 2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly
1 income. Refer to Instructions for definition of income.
| 2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually
1 paid. (Do not enter alimony ordered for this case.)

I 4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of
•
1 children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base
1 Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here.
1 5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line
| 3 ty the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain
each parent's share of the Base Support Obligation.
P.

""

,"•"

'•"

mmmme^amsmeBBBSa-aB^BBB!^aBBBBam—*mm-m-mm—-mmmi

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

$
—

9.

( ) Mother

*

36 %

64 %

817.20

$1,452.80

—

$1,452.80

(x) Father

Is the support award ordered the guideline amount in Line 7?
(x) Yes ( ) No If NO, enter the amount ordered: $

10. What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation?
{ ) property settlement
( ) excessive debts of the marriage
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent
( ) other:
Attorney Bar No. 0654

( ) Electronic filing

$6,951.00
$2,270.00

f

7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down t h e amount i n Line 6 f o r
the Obligor Parent o r e n t e r t h e amount f o r t h e Low Income Table.
8. Which parent is the obligor?

COMBINED

(x) Manual filing

*2,134 (6 children) + 136 - (7th child) until graduates in May 1997

25
138.93^
142.79
146.65
1*50.51.
154.37

137.27
141.09
144.9a
148.71,
152.52,

133.20
136.89
140.5*
144.29
147.99

| l p p a , c 162.09
t,t 169.80
v 177.52,
1//.52,
u ,^185.2<
**c ??. 2 * 9 ^
200.68
208.4Q

160.15
167.7ft
#* 5/ ^. 4400
183.0X
H?-<
198.28
205.91

155.39, 154.10^149.16^
162. 79it 161.43*156.2^
170.1%
170.1* 168.7?;
168.77: 163.37
'
"— 177.59'176.111,170.47
. W L R 3 . 4 S ,177.57

)ZZ 239.27 236.41
fctf 246.99^,244.04;
h*l 2 ? * » 7 0 ^ ^ * ^
9$ 2 f i . 4 r 25^.29^

229.39 C N 2£7.47 220.19
236.79C, 234.81^ 2*7.29
244.19^ 2 4 ^ 1 5 ^ 2 ^ 3 9
251.59^i49f4^241f4^

7
4
8
6
4
2
0
8
6
4

2
0
9
9
9

*

BLENDED MONTHLY PAYMENTS
AMORTISATION IN JIAItS
29
30
26
35 .

„

132.08
135.75
139.42
143.09
146.76

8%
40

45

, 50

123.42
126.85
130.27
133,70
137.13

122.27
125.67
129.07
4/32.46
135.86

146.02 1,43.99
152.97^150.84
159.93 ,' 157.70
166.88 164.56
173.83 171.41

142.65
149.45
156.24
16i.03
169.82

192.351 190.78^ 184.67 180.79 178.27
199.79^198.12 191.78 187.74, 185.12
w._ . _ * 198.88 '194.69 191.98
205.9a 201.65 198.84
213.0^208.60^ i05.69

176.62
"183.41
190.20
Jj^.99
$&79

127.85
131.40
134.95
138.51'
142.06

125.16
128.64
132.11
135.59
139.07

215.55 212.55 -210.58
222.50^ 219.41 %ti*}7
229.46^226.26 ^ » , 1 7
2^6.41 rr 233.12 230.96

246,83
253.69
,2f? f 79r 2 B i ; i ^ ; 2 7 K ^ 569.9(>:/#4.2f;; 560.54
n o i ^ O T ^ l t t ^ W.17T; 277.017 tfUlT* 167.40

i^^Mtt a% aafcSBftSK <2$#

,244.54
£5<W34
^«13
/£64*42
k2?1.71
<*78.51
285.30
292.09
,298.89
£$•68

_ ^ f 355.04. v 350.ec> 3 4 0 . 3 8 ^ 3 ^ 5 4 , 326.71, 319.85 315.39 312.47
0$<? 3^2.7f 358.43^347«7C34^87l33X8Jr 326.80 3*2.25 319,26
f o L ^ N M t L 366.0*' 355.1^1352.21^340.93^333.75, 329.11 326.06
O ^ f t r W ^ i 37^684:362*58:^359.55^ 348.01 > 346.71 u 335.96 332.85
9
2 9

M6m^^h^^h 4^h^^A

m*U*h* ^ *<*

2.43..377.10 373.61
Kl9; 111.38 iD7;S7

^•^rfjlKS?* 480^9^IWAh l^il^J^ls^'l^lu
617.4&, 610.0fc,r59L.96t, 597.02^568.21

?4U53

556.25., 548.51

i577.39
-™5**- 0 5 R4 8 » 2 I J*& 9 %L*t&7&uU#rlh 591.02, $82.79 ,611.35
B2^4.64],6*6.34: S $ . 9 C ^ . 3 § ; U 3 9 . 2 4 r 6 2 5 . 7 9
4;y3^23^J24 ? 475'702.95L^97;08i 1 :S74.75 (>c 660.55,
8
9

4 s $ * W ? & ^ ? ? & MUo
^^

617,07 ,611.35
651.35 c645.32

*3n#

